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ABSTENTION, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND 
RECASTING THE MEANING OF  
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
William P. Marshall 
ABSTRACT—In his 1984 landmark article, Abstention, Separation of 
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, Professor Martin H. 
Redish advanced the thesis that the abstention doctrines constituted a 
violation of separation of powers. Redish’s theory was, and is, 
controversial. The suggestion that an embedded area of federal courts law 
is unconstitutional is, at the least, highly provocative. It is also ultimately 
unpersuasive. There are too many justifications underlying the legitimacy 
of abstention to support the conclusion that it violates the Constitution. Yet, 
as this Essay demonstrates, one does not have to be persuaded by Redish’s 
constitutional conclusion to appreciate the landmark significance of his 
project. Prior to Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the 
Judicial Function, the virtues of judicial restraint had been reflexively 
characterized as judicial deference to the decisions of political actors. 
Professor Redish, however, replaced this understanding with the more 
nuanced view that judicial restraint might also mean courts performing the 
tasks to which they were assigned. In so doing, Redish fundamentally 
recast the debate as to the proper understanding of the role and obligations 
of the federal judiciary and the meaning of judicial activism and judicial 
restraint. 
 
AUTHOR—Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I am 
extremely grateful to Elizabeth Gibson and Jack Beermann for their 
comments on an earlier version of this Essay. I would also like to thank 
Anderson Chang for his excellent research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Abstention allows federal courts to avoid deciding disputes affecting 
the states and state law, or at least to delay hearing such disputes until the 
matters have been heard by the state courts. In so doing, abstention 
accomplishes a number of goals. It lessens the possibility that federal 
courts will needlessly decide constitutional issues. It minimizes federal 
court friction with state courts, state executives, and state legislatures. It 
protects against unnecessary federal court intrusion into sensitive matters of 
state policy. For these reasons, the abstention doctrines have been generally 
considered models of judicial restraint. 
Professor Martin H. Redish, however, powerfully challenged this view 
of abstention. In Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the 
Judicial Function,1 Redish contended that the abstention doctrines were not 
exercises of judicial restraint and humility; they were examples of judicial 
hubris. Abstention was not an instance of the federal judiciary’s deferring 
to the other branches; it was an example of the federal courts rejecting the 
duly imposed obligations that the other branches had placed upon them.2 
Abstention, Redish concluded, was a violation of the separation of powers.3 
Redish’s theory was, and is, controversial. The suggestion that an 
embedded area of federal courts law is not only ill-advised but actually 
illegal is, at the least, a dramatic departure from a settled understanding. 
Redish’s theory, moreover, is ultimately not convincing. There are too 
many strong justifications underlying the legitimacy of abstention to 
support the conclusion that it violates the Constitution. 
 
1 Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 
94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984). 
2 See id. at 77. 
3 See id. 
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Yet, one does not have to be persuaded by Redish’s constitutional 
conclusion to appreciate the landmark significance of his project. And that 
is the point that I intend to develop in this Essay. Abstention, Separation of 
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function rightly holds status as one 
of the most important and transformative accounts of the law of federal 
courts that has yet been written. But as I will argue, Redish’s article holds 
this status not because it is correct but because it changed the way that the 
meaning of judicial restraint was conceptualized. 
Part I of this Essay briefly describes the abstention doctrines and the 
nature of Redish’s attack upon them. Part II discusses the academic 
reaction to Redish’s thesis, including the arguments as to why Redish’s 
bottom line that the abstention doctrines violate separation of powers has 
not proved convincing. Part III demonstrates why, nevertheless, Redish’s 
thesis was, and is, so fundamental to the proper understanding of the role 
and obligations of the federal judiciary and to the meaning of judicial 
activism. 
I. THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINES 
A. Background 
The term “abstention” refers to a set of judicially created doctrines 
under which federal courts may choose to decline to exercise their 
jurisdiction over cases otherwise appropriately before them.4 Railroad 
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,5 decided in 1941, is generally 
considered the first major case on the subject, although there were some 
antecedents.6 The Pullman Court held—creating what has become known 
as Pullman abstention—that a federal court should abstain when state law 
is unclear and a state court decision may make federal adjudication of a 
constitutional issue unnecessary.7 
Abstention soon proved to be a growth industry, and by the time 
Redish wrote Abstention and Separation of Powers, the Supreme Court had 
created no fewer than five separate abstention doctrines. Each abstention 
doctrine, like Pullman, became known by the Supreme Court decision in 
which the particular doctrine was announced. Burford abstention (1943) 
held that federal courts should abstain in deference to complex state 
administrative procedures.8 Thibodaux abstention (1959) decided that 
 
4 Id. at 71; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 783 (5th ed. 2007). 
5 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
6 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1059 n.1 (6th ed. 2009); see also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584, 605 
(1858) (holding that federal courts did not have jurisdiction over domestic relations matters such as 
alimony and divorce). 
7 See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500. 
8 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943). 
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federal courts should abstain if state law is uncertain and important state 
interests such as eminent domain are at issue.9 Younger abstention (1971), 
undoubtedly the most important of the abstention doctrines, announced that 
federal courts must abstain from enjoining ongoing state criminal 
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.10 Colorado River 
abstention (1976) concluded that abstention could be required in deference 
to ongoing, parallel state proceedings in certain circumstances.11 
After Colorado River, the burgeoning of abstention subsided. Still, in 
1984, coincidentally the same year that Redish wrote Abstention and 
Separation of Powers, the Court in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.12 appeared 
once more to dramatically expand abstention, this time by flirting with the 
idea of applying Younger abstention to all civil litigation. But Pennzoil was 
quickly limited to its particular circumstances,13 and one of the remarkable 
things about abstention is how stable the doctrine has been for over thirty 
years. 
B. Standard Criticisms of Abstention 
Abstention is not hard to criticize, and it may be useful to note some of 
the other commonly noted objections to it before reaching Redish’s specific 
critique. One problem with abstention should already be obvious. Five 
separate strains of abstention have made the area inordinately convoluted, 
and even the Court itself at times seems unable to keep the lines of 
demarcation between the various doctrines analytically clear.14 Second, the 
abstention doctrines often require federal courts to refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction in circumstances when access to the federal courts is most 
needed.15 Both diversity and federal question jurisdiction are justified in 
large part on the notion that a federal forum may be necessary to avoid 
state court bias.16 Abstention, however, is based in part on the assertion that 
 
9 See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27‒30 (1959). 
10 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971). 
11 See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976). 
12 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (applying Younger to a suit between two private parties). 
13 See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367‒68 (1989) 
(holding that Younger does not apply to all pending civil actions). As Professor Chemerinsky explains, 
Pennzoil may be limited to cases between private parties that involve judicial enforcement of court 
orders. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 848. 
14 See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814 (grouping Burford and 
Thibodaux abstention into a single category and noting that “[a]bstention is also appropriate where there 
have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public 
import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar”); see also, e.g., Karakas v. 
McKeown, 783 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (noting that there is disagreement in the 
cases and in commentary as to the number and nature of the abstention doctrines). 
15 See Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 538–43 (1989). 
16 Cf. id. at 541 (discussing how avoiding possible state court bias is “[t]he premise of diversity 
jurisdiction”). 
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principles of comity and federalism demand deference to state courts when 
the state has a particularly strong interest in a dispute’s outcome.17 Yet, as 
Professor Barry Friedman notes, “Where the state’s interest in the outcome 
of the dispute is very high . . . so is the potential for state court bias against 
the federal claimant . . . .”18 The “perverse” result of all this is that “the 
Court requires abstention in those cases where bias against federal claims is 
most likely.”19 
Third, applications of the doctrines often lead to nightmares in judicial 
administration. Under Pullman abstention, for example, the federal court is 
supposed to retain jurisdiction over the case while the ambiguous state law 
question is sent to the state courts for resolution. The case is then to be sent 
back to the federal court for final resolution. But lengthy delays in such a 
system are inevitable as cases are bounced back and forth from federal to 
state court. The litigation in Thibodaux, for example, took seven years to 
complete;20 the litigation in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical 
Examiners,21 discussed below, took over nine.22 
Fourth, the maneuvering between court systems also creates problems 
in the application of the law of res judicata. The adjudication of the state 
law issue by the state court will often include the litigation of facts or legal 
issues that are germane to the federal issues in the case. Should the federal 
court treat the issues resolved by the state court as res judicata? The Court 
in the England case, noted above, held that res judicata did not apply as 
long as the party seeking federal jurisdiction explicitly reserved its right to 
litigate the federal issues before the federal court.23 But questions as to 
whether a litigant has adequately preserved its rights to return to federal 
court can lead to their own set of litigable issues.24 Moreover, even when 
those issues are resolved, the requirement of having the litigant explicitly 
reserve its right to return to federal court invariably leads to an intractable 
practical concern for the litigant. The reservation requirement effectively 
demands that the litigant stand before a state court judge and state in not so 
many words, “I am here to litigate the state issue only and will reserve my 
right to litigate the federal issue in federal court because I do not trust the 
state courts to appropriately decide this issue.” This is not, I would suggest, 
 
17 See id. at 542. 
18 Id. at 542–43. 
19 Id. at 543. 
20 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 812 n.17. 
21 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
22 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 812 n.17. 
23 See England, 375 U.S. at 419. 
24 See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005) (discussing 
constitutional issues implicated by reservation of federal questions under England). 
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generally an effective way for a lawyer to build rapport with a state  court 
judge.25 
Fifth, the legal wrangling over abstention leads to yet another set of 
awkward litigation postures. Consider a case in which the litigant raises a 
constitutional challenge to a newly enacted state law. The incentive of the 
state defendant, should the defendant want the court to abstain, is to argue 
that the state law is ambiguous, a strategy that is not the best should the 
state later decide that it wants to prosecute the federal court plaintiff under 
that law. The federal plaintiff meanwhile must simultaneously undermine 
one of its own potential defenses to a later state court action by arguing, to 
avoid federal court abstention, that the law actually is clear. 
Sixth, abstention is inconsistent with the Court’s own rhetoric. In 
Cohens v. Virgina,26 for example, Chief Justice John Marshall stated, “We 
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, 
than to usurp that which is not given.”27 At other times, the Court has 
described the exercise of jurisdiction as a “duty”28 and declared that federal 
courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the 
jurisdiction given them.”29 In stark contrast to these assertions, however, 
abstention is a vehicle in which federal courts, by definition, “decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction” and do not meet their “duties” and “unflagging 
obligations.” 
Finally, although this is less a criticism of the viability of abstention 
than it is of the case law underlying the doctrines, abstention cases include 
some of the most disingenuous in Supreme Court history.30 Consider the 
juxtaposition of Younger v. Harris31 and Mitchum v. Foster.32 In Younger, 
as mentioned above, the Court crafted a judge-made rule that a federal 
court should not enjoin an ongoing state criminal proceeding absent 
extraordinary circumstances. In so holding, the Court declined to rely on an 
existing federal statute, the Anti-Injunction Act,33 although that provision 
 
25 There is of course no guarantee that a state court will even agree to hear the state law issue in 
these circumstances. See Harris Cnty. Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88–89 (1975) (holding 
that a federal court should dismiss the case without prejudice when the state court refuses to allow the 
federal litigant to reserve its federal issues for the federal forum). 
26 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
27 Id. at 404. 
28 Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909). 
29 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
30 I recognize the enormity of this claim given that Court disingenuousness is not exactly a rare 
phenomenon. See, e.g., ___ v. ____, __ U.S. __ ( ) (the reader should feel free to insert her own case 
citation). 
31 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
32 407 U.S. 225 (1972). 
33 See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006) (“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay 
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in 
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”). 
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explicitly maintained that a federal court should not enjoin state 
proceedings unless expressly authorized by Congress.34 As the Younger 
Court stated: 
Because our holding rests on the absence of the factors necessary under 
equitable principles to justify federal intervention, we have no occasion to 
consider whether 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which prohibits an injunction against state 
court proceedings “except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress” would 
in and of itself be controlling under the circumstances of this case.35 
One year after Younger, the Court in Mitchum v. Foster decided the 
question of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provided an “expressly authorized” 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Despite the fact that § 1983 has no 
express language indicating that the statute provides an exception to the 
Anti-Injunction Act,36 the Court ruled that it created such an exception 
anyway because the policies underlying § 1983 supported having the 
availability of federal injunctive relief.37 In so doing, the Court effectively 
created what can only be termed an “implied express exception,” heretofore 
a linguistic impossibility. Moreover, although Younger had explicitly stated 
that it was not addressing the Anti-Injunction Act issue, the Mitchum Court 
somehow held that Younger actually stood as direct authority for the 
proposition that § 1983 was an expressly authorized exception to the Act.38 
It gets better. As noted above, the Mitchum Court based its ruling in 
large part on the policy concern that § 1983 was designed specifically to 
allow federal courts to serve as protection for the individual against state 
power. As the Mitchum Court stated: 
 
34 See id. 
35 Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. 
36 The relevant text of § 1983 is as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
37 See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242‒43. 
38 See id. at 231 (“While the Court in Younger and its companion cases expressly disavowed 
deciding the question now before us—whether § 1983 comes within the ‘expressly authorized’ 
exception of the anti-injunction statute—it is evident that our decisions in those cases cannot be 
disregarded in deciding this question. In the first place, if § 1983 is not within the statutory exception, 
then the anti-injunction statute would have absolutely barred the injunction issued in Younger, as the 
appellant in that case argued, and there would have been no occasion whatever for the Court to decide 
that case upon the ‘policy’ ground of ‘Our Federalism.’ Secondly, if § 1983 is not within the ‘expressly 
authorized’ exception of the anti-injunction statute, then we must overrule Younger and its companion 
cases insofar as they recognized the permissibility of injunctive relief against pending criminal 
prosecutions in certain limited and exceptional circumstances. For, under the doctrine of Atlantic Coast 
Line, the anti-injunction statute would, in a § 1983 case, then be an ‘absolute prohibition’ against 
federal equity intervention in a pending state criminal or civil proceeding—under any circumstances 
whatever.” (citation omitted)). 
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 This legislative history [of § 1983] makes evident that Congress clearly 
conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the 
Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was 
concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized 
that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those 
rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts. 
 . . . The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between 
the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights—to 
protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 
“whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.” In carrying out that 
purpose, Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue 
injunctions . . . . [T]his Court long ago recognized that federal injunctive relief 
against a state court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to 
prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of a person’s constitutional 
rights.39 
Nevertheless, despite the eloquence and power of this language, 
Mitchum turned out to be no more than a mirage. Mitchum involved an 
effort by a federal litigant to enjoin a state law civil nuisance action brought 
by the state to shut down an adult bookstore.40 Because the federal lawsuit 
in Mitchum was an attempt to enjoin a state civil action, the case was 
therefore initially distinguishable from Younger, which had held only that 
federal courts could not enjoin state criminal actions and did not resolve 
whether federal courts were similarly barred from enjoining state civil 
enforcement actions.41 Mitchum, in turn, decided only the Anti-Injunction 
Act question, again leaving open the question of whether Younger should 
extend to state civil enforcement actions.42 The door quickly closed. Three 
years after Mitchum, the Court in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.43 held that 
Younger barred the federal courts from enjoining a state law civil nuisance 
action brought to shut down an adult establishment, the exact same fact 
pattern as in Mitchum.44 According to Huffman, Younger principles applied 
to federal actions to enjoin state civil enforcement proceedings brought “in 
aid of and closely related to criminal statutes.”45 The victory for the federal 
litigant in Mitchum, in short, had been completely Pyrrhic and the opinion’s 
language setting forth the compelling reasons why § 1983 plaintiffs needed 
access to the federal courts completely hollow. It may be, as the Mitchum 
Court explained, “that federal injunctive relief against a state court 
proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great, 
 
39 Id. at 242 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)). 
40 See id. at 227. 
41 See id. at 230. 
42 See id. at 242‒43. 
43 420 U.S. 592 (1975). 
44 See id. at 595–99, 611‒13. 
45 Id. at 604. 
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immediate, and irreparable loss of a person’s constitutional rights,”46 but 
that “essentiality” was not sufficient to overcome judge-made Younger 
abstention. 
Equally important, for our purposes, the Younger–Mitchum–Huffman 
trilogy also sent a clear message. The Court would not allow the federal 
courts to be constrained from issuing § 1983-based injunctions by the 
application of a federal statute (the Anti-Injunction Act), but it would 
prohibit federal courts from issuing § 1983-based injunctions against state 
proceedings by the application of its own judge-made doctrines. As Redish 
stated, “It is difficult to imagine a starker illustration of judicial usurpation 
of legislative authority.”47 
C. Redish’s Critique of Abstention 
The Court’s disregard of congressional directives in favor of marching 
to its own drummer was, of course, the central theme in Abstention, 
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function. Redish’s 
thesis was as simple as it was elegant: When federal courts abstain from 
exercising the jurisdiction vested in them by Congress, and when they 
abstain from enforcing federally enacted civil rights statutes, they are 
engaging in illegitimate judicial lawmaking, effectively violating 
constitutional guarantees of separation of powers.48 As he explained: 
 Presumably no one would deny that a federal court cannot legitimately 
invalidate a federal statute solely because of its unwise policies, or because it 
would make judges work harder than they believe they should, or because the 
judges themselves would not have enacted such legislation. Such behavior by 
the judiciary would amount to a blatant—and indefensible—usurpation of 
legislative authority. . . . Yet, in a sense, the abstention doctrines amount to 
such usurpation.49 
Having thus articulated his thesis, Redish then proceeded to defend it 
against anticipated objections. Three of Redish’s defenses to his thesis are 
especially notable50: he argues that (1) abstention is not justified by an 
implied delegation by Congress to the judiciary, (2) abstention is not 
supported by principles of equity, and (3) abstention is not necessary to 
serve as a safety valve against the potentially disastrous results that might 
occur if the federal courts did not refrain from exercising their jurisdiction 
in certain circumstances. Each of these contentions will be discussed in 
turn. 
 
46 Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242. 
47 Redish, supra note 1, at 88. 
48 See id. at 71, 114–15. 
49 Id. at 72. 
50 Redish actually discusses four anticipated objections to his work: the three discussed below and 
an additional objection relating only to his attack on Pullman abstention—specifically, that the exercise 
of Pullman abstention only delays and does not defeat federal jurisdiction. See id. at 90. 
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Implied Delegation. The “implied delegation” defense of abstention 
posits that Congress, in its governing statutes, intended to give the federal 
courts the authority to modify or limit the exercise of its jurisdiction to 
avoid “friction within the federal system.”51 To Redish, this justification 
was unpersuasive for a number of reasons. To begin with, Redish argued, 
Congress itself had explicitly limited the exercise of federal jurisdiction in 
a series of statutes indicating that it had chosen to specifically legislate on 
the subject rather than broadly delegate.52 And while Redish conceded that 
“[i]t is true that the existence of this program of statutorily dictated 
abstention does not necessarily preclude Congress from vesting in the 
federal judiciary the authority to extend abstention beyond these legislative 
limitations,” he nevertheless concluded that “it does establish that federal 
court abstention is not an area in which Congress has traditionally deferred 
to judicial discretion.”53 
Moreover, Redish continued, the implied delegation argument was 
seriously flawed for the basic reason that there was no evidentiary support 
for the proposition that Congress intended to allocate such discretion.54 As 
he wrote: 
No supporter of partial abstention has pointed to anything approaching hard 
evidence in the legislative history of either the original enactment or the more 
recent reenactments of the substantive and jurisdictional civil rights statutes 
which suggests that Congress intended that the federal courts possess 
authority to modify or limit otherwise unlimited legislation.55 
Redish’s response to the implied delegation argument also addressed 
the contention that even if Congress may not have originally intended to 
delegate the authority to the federal courts to abstain, it had nevertheless 
acquiesced in the practice by not overturning the abstention doctrines by 
statutory directive. Again, Redish was not persuaded. To Redish, reliance 
on Congress’s failure to overturn a judge-made doctrine as a rationale for 
keeping that doctrine in place “effectively condones through legislative 
inertia what was initially an improper and unauthorized judicial usurpation 
of legislative authority.”56 
Equity. The abstention doctrines, and most particularly Younger, are 
often defended based upon traditional notions of equity.57 The Younger 
Court, for example, directly relied on traditional equitable principles in 
 
51 Id. at 80. 
52 See id. at 81. These statutory limitations include such provisions as the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 
U.S.C § 2283 (2006), and the Tax Injunction Act, id. § 1341. 
53 Redish, supra note 1, at 81. 
54 See id. 
55 Id. at 81‒82. 
56 Id. at 82. 
57 Equity was also cited as a justification for abstention in the Pullman decision. See R.R. Comm’n 
of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941). 
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holding that a federal court should not enjoin an ongoing criminal 
proceeding. As Younger explained, traditional equity rules required that a 
court should not issue an injunction when there was an available adequate 
remedy at law.58 Based on this principle, the Younger Court reasoned that a 
federal court should not enjoin an ongoing state court prosecution because 
the state court defendant had an adequate remedy available in the form of 
his ability to raise his constitutional objections as a defense in the state 
court action.59 
Redish’s responses to the equity argument were particularly cogent. 
He noted that the traditional notions of equity, upon which Younger relied, 
came from the English system, which had a unitary composition,60 and not 
from a federalism model that was divided into two distinct judicial 
structures. Traditional equitable principles regarding the availability of an 
adequate remedy at law as a bar to issuing an injunction, Redish 
maintained, meant the availability of that remedy in the same judicial 
system (the federal courts) and not the possible availability of a remedy in 
another judicial system (the state courts).61 Even more powerfully, Redish 
took on the proposition at its core that the ability of a state defendant to 
raise his constitutional defenses in state court constituted an adequate 
remedy at law. As Redish noted, the position that state courts provided an 
adequate remedy at law for the vindication of federal rights was completely 
inconsistent with the basic premise underlying federal question jurisdiction 
and substantive statutes like § 1983—specifically, that state courts were not 
adequate protectors of federal rights.62 
Safety Valve. Redish last addressed the contention that the abstention 
doctrine might be justified under a “safety valve” rationale, meaning that 
“the social and political results of an abolition of abstention would be so 
disastrous that Congress could not possibly have contemplated them.”63 
Reviewing each abstention doctrine, Redish found no such disastrous threat 
to be imminent. Redish recognized, of course, that in the context of 
Younger abstention, the possibility that state defendants raising a Fourth 
Amendment claim would routinely “walk across the street to the federal 
courthouse to seek an injunction of the state proceeding as a violation of 
section 1983”64 could constitute a substantial disruption. But he argued that 
 
58 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971). 
59 See id. at 49. 
60 Redish, supra note 1, at 85. 
61 See id. at 85‒86; see also Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 361 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[I]t was never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should . . . dismiss 
a suit merely because a State court could entertain it.”). 
62 See Redish, supra note 1, at 111; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–74 (1961) 
(asserting essentially the same rationale regarding § 1983—that the statute was enacted to “provide[] a 
remedy where state law was inadequate”). 
63 Redish, supra note 1, at 90. 
64 Id. at 92. 
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the threat was considerably overstated because no deprivation of the 
defendant’s rights would occur until after a conviction.65 And although 
Redish conceded that the availability of the federal courts to enjoin state 
courts based upon other alleged constitutional violations could potentially 
be disruptive, he contended that any resulting friction was the result of the 
congressional decision to provide federal court protection against potential 
state deprivations of federal rights.66 
II. CRITIQUING REDISH’S CRITIQUE 
Redish’s assertion that the abstention doctrines were unconstitutional 
and his defense of this position against possible counterarguments was 
brilliant, creative, and prescient. It did not, however, prove to be 
persuasive. The Supreme Court, as far as I am aware, has never directly 
engaged the theory that abstention constitutes a constitutional violation of 
separation of powers,67 and although Redish’s thesis provoked considerable 
discussion from leading federal courts scholars, the academic response has 
been generally one of disagreement.68 
In Jurisdiction and Discretion,69 for example, Professor David Shapiro 
directly questioned Redish’s characterization of the abstention doctrines as 
judicial usurpation of the legislative process.70 To Shapiro, abstention 
doctrines that bestowed discretion in the federal courts for exercising 
jurisdiction were nothing new and were fully consistent with other judicial 
doctrines,71 common law history and traditions, and ideals of federalism 
 
65 See id. at 92‒93 (“By its terms, section 1983 authorizes injunctive relief only if a federal right 
has been violated.”). 
66 See id. at 94. 
67 But see A.T. v. Cnty. of Cook, 613 F. Supp. 775, 777 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (“A nationally 
renowned authority recently has argued forcefully that the Younger doctrine violates principles of 
separation of powers in that the Court was substituting its policy judgments for those of Congress in 
carving out exceptions to broad congressional grants of jurisdiction.” (citing Redish, supra note 1)). 
68 One notable exception to the academic commentary opposing Redish’s position is Professor 
Donald L. Doernberg, who, citing Chief Justice John Marshall, has characterized the Court’s failure to 
exercise the jurisdiction afforded to it as “treason to the [C]onstitution.” Donald L. Doernberg, “You 
Can Lead a Horse to Water . . .”: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Allow the Exercise of Original 
Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 999, 1002 (1989–90) (quoting Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). From the other side, Professor Calvin Massey has argued 
that not only are the abstention doctrines constitutionally permissible, but also that some aspects of 
abstention are constitutionally required. See Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits 
of the Judicial Power of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811. 
69 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985). 
70 See id. at 544. 
71 Among the examples Shapiro lists of other practices and doctrines that give federal courts 
discretion over whether or not to exercise jurisdiction are justiciability, forum non conveniens, 
exhaustion of remedies, and equitable discretion. See id. at 548–70. These are instances where, as 
Professor Shapiro states regarding justiciability, there is “a penumbra within which the Court sees itself 
as having discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction.” Id. at 554. 
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and comity.72 Characterizing the law in the statutes and constitutional 
provisions that formed the “charter” of federal jurisdiction to be “organic,” 
Shapiro argued that the courts were in a better position to resolve how to 
exercise jurisdiction under those measures because jurisdictional matters 
“intimately affect the courts’ relations with each other as well as with the 
other branches of government.”73 Thus, a grant of jurisdiction should be 
“read as an authorization . . . to entertain an action but not as an inexorable 
command.”74 Shapiro’s prescription was that jurisdictional statutes should 
determine the amount of discretion the courts are afforded in making 
jurisdictional decisions, and the courts should operate within that grant of 
discretion to weigh principles of equitable discretion, federalism and 
comity, separation of powers, and judicial administration against a 
presumption of assertion of jurisdiction to make a final determination of 
whether abstention is appropriate.75 
Michael Wells, in the not so subtly titled Why Professor Redish Is 
Wrong About Abstention,76 challenged Professor Redish’s institutional 
objections to the abstention doctrines as being based upon a “faulty 
premise.”77 Specifically, Professor Wells argued that § 1983, the statute that 
Redish argued was most undermined by abstention, was never intended to 
create such a broad cause of action in the first place.78 Section 1983 was 
originally adopted by Congress to address the problem of the Southern 
states’ failure to protect blacks from oppression by groups like the Ku Klux 
Klan.79 It was not until 1960 that § 1983 became a broad vehicle by which 
individuals could bring actions against the state for violations of their 
federal rights.80 Therefore, according to Professor Wells, abstention is 
merely a judge-made restriction on a judge-made expansion of federal 
jurisdiction, and not a repudiation of congressional intent as Professor 
Redish contended.81 Further, Professor Wells argued that both the judicial 
expansion and restriction of jurisdiction are legitimate creations of federal 
common law due to the presence of a strong federal interest in resolution of 
the issue and Congress’s failure to act on the issue.82 
Professor Ann Althouse, meanwhile, questioned Professor Redish’s 
contention that Congress alone has authority to determine the jurisdiction 
 
72 See id. at 545, 550‒52. 
73 Id. at 574. 
74 Id. at 575. 
75 See id. at 578‒79. 
76 Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985). 
77 Id. at 1097. 
78 See id. at 1098. 
79 See id. at 1103. 
80 See id. at 1103–04. 
81 See id. at 1098. 
82 See id. at 1124‒25. 
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of federal courts as being based on the false notion that jurisdictional 
statutes are unambiguous and leave no room for judicial discretion.83 To 
her, the jurisdictional statutes were not so clear. And because the statutes 
were written in general terms, the abstention doctrines did not represent a 
usurpation of congressional power, but rather a product of a Judicial 
Branch “partnership with Congress” wherein “each institution performs 
aspects of the jurisdictional law-making function that fall particularly 
within its capacity.”84 Furthermore, Professor Althouse argued there was no 
threat to democratic decisionmaking posed by the abstention doctrines 
because Congress retained the ultimate power to overrule any abuse of 
jurisdictional discretion though legislation.85 
Finally, Professor Jack Beermann, although agreeing with Professor 
Redish that Congress ought to decide the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
rejected, on other grounds, the conclusion that abstention violated the 
separation of powers.86 First, Beermann pointed out a textual weakness in 
the separation of powers argument in that the Constitution does not 
explicitly allocate authority over jurisdiction.87 Second, Professor 
Beermann challenged Professor Redish’s conception of the separation of 
powers, suggesting that rather than having the branches conceived as only 
possessing exclusive powers, there might be instances, jurisdiction being 
one of them, where Congress and the judiciary enjoyed a shared power.88 
As Beermann wrote, “The idea of assigning primary responsibility for the 
exercise of certain powers to different branches does not foreclose the 
possibility that the other branches were also intended to exercise those 
powers to some degree.”89 Third, Beermann posited that abstention might 
also be defended on grounds that it could be necessary for the Court’s own 
self-preservation because it allowed the Court to insulate itself from the 
backlash that could result if it were forced into making exceedingly 
unpopular decisions.90 
 
83 See Ann Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction Law, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1035, 1049 (1989–90) (“Judge-made doctrines qualify and accommodate statutes that are 
written in general terms and that cannot anticipate the realities of litigation encountered by judges.”). 
84 Id. 
85 See id. at 1048–49. Professor Althouse suggested, however, that abstention would raise different 
concerns if the Court were to continue to apply abstention after Congress explicitly outlawed the 
practice. See id. at 1048. 
86 See Jack M. Beermann, “Bad” Judicial Activism and Liberal Federal-Courts Doctrine: A 
Comment on Professor Doernberg and Professor Redish, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1053, 1058 (1989–
90). 
87 See id. 
88 To be sure, Beermann offers his notion of shared powers only tentatively and does not claim he 
fully endorses this position. See id. at 1065. 
89 Id. at 1062. 
90 See id. at 1065–66. For an example where the Court may have used a jurisdictional device—in 
that case, standing—to avoid exactly this sort of backlash, see Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17‒18 (2004), holding a noncustodial parent did not have standing to challenge 
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For many of the same reasons raised by the scholars cited above, I also 
find Redish’s arguments that abstention is unconstitutional to be 
unconvincing. Furthermore, while I believe Redish did a remarkable job in 
anticipating counterarguments to his thesis, he did not, to my mind, entirely 
overcome those objections. His rejection of the implied delegation 
argument, for example, too quickly dismissed the argument that Congress 
has acquiesced in the Court’s abstention decisions by not overturning them. 
To be sure, the rule that Congress’s failure to overturn the Court’s 
interpretation of a statute means that Congress has acquiesced in that 
interpretation is controversial.91 But the Court has accepted the rule of 
legislative acquiescence in its statutory interpretation outside the abstention 
context, and there is no reason why it should not be equally applied in 
matters of jurisdiction.92 To the contrary, although it may be true that 
legislative inaction may not always be an accurate guide to legislative 
intent because of problems of inertia and crowded legislative agendas,93 the 
fact is Congress has consistently demonstrated that it can and will act when 
it believes the Court has too narrowly interpreted one of its jurisdictional 
statutes.94 
Redish’s attack on the Court’s use of equity as a justification for 
abstention is equally incomplete. Although Redish’s point that Younger 
 
the constitutionality of the use of the words “under God” in the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance at 
his daughter’s school. 
91 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[V]indication by congressional inaction is a canard.”). 
92 See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283‒84 (1972) (refusing to overturn a previous Court 
decision holding that baseball was exempt from antitrust laws). 
93 See Redish, supra note 1, at 83 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal 
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 22‒23 (1985)). 
94 Congress’s decision to eliminate the jurisdictional amount requirement in the federal question 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006), for example, was in part a response to the problem that the federal 
courts, including the Supreme Court, had ruled that there was no statutory basis for public assistance 
beneficiaries to sue in federal court for violations of their federal statutory rights to assistance benefits. 
S. REP. NO. 96-827, at 14, 16‒17 (1980); see also Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 
(1979) (holding that a welfare recipient could not sue the state for purportedly not granting her relief 
required by federal law because there was no statutory jurisdictional basis to maintain a claim); 
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 679 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th 
Cong. 102‒04 (1979) (statement of Michael Trister, Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law). In 
Chapman, the recipients had originally brought their action under § 1343, which allowed plaintiffs to 
bring civil rights claims without satisfying any jurisdictional amount requirement, but the Court ruled 
that their claim for relief under the federal statute was not a civil rights claim. See Chapman, 441 U.S. 
at 621. One year after Chapman was decided, Congress eliminated the jurisdictional amount 
requirement in the federal question jurisdiction statute (§ 1331), allowing claimants such as the 
plaintiffs in Chapman to bring their federal statutory benefits claims as a federal question rather than as 
a civil rights claim. Similarly, Congress passed § 1367, allowing federal question jurisdiction over 
pendent parties in reaction to the Court’s decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), 
which held that § 1331 did not authorize pendent party jurisdiction. (Finley and the passage of § 1367, 
of course, could not inform Redish’s analysis because both occurred after Redish wrote Abstention, 
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function.) 
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misapplied the traditional equitable “adequate remedy at law” rule in 
concluding that a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal 
proceeding is certainly cogent, the dismissal of this one equitable principle 
as a ground for decision does not mean that others are not available. Redish 
may be right that equity in England did not mean avoidance of friction 
within a federal system because England did not have a federal structure,95 
but that does not mean that equitable principles should not be expanded to 
reflect such a concern. 
Redish’s discussion of the safety valve rationale, in turn, also 
significantly understates the problem with the disruption of state 
proceedings that would occur without Younger’s prohibition against a 
federal court enjoining state criminal proceedings. Redish is likely correct 
that most of the attempts by state criminal defendants to enjoin state 
proceedings would be unsuccessful, but the ultimate disposition of the 
federal claim is not what is of concern. The greater disruption to the state 
criminal process is that costs in both time and resources for the state to 
have to defend against a federal injunctive action would be exorbitant, 
particularly since in most cases there would be little cost to the state 
defendant’s pursuing the federal injunctive claim. 
The most devastating attack on Redish’s thesis, however, came from 
one Martin H. Redish. In Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court 
Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation 
Problem, Professor Redish compared the utility of the theory that 
abstention constitutes a violation of the separation of powers to that of 
voting for Walter Mondale in the 1984 presidential election.96 To the 
Redish of Intersystemic Redundancy, there was none. No matter what the 
“merits of [the separation of powers] argument, it is not one which the 
Supreme Court has ever accepted.”97 For Redish, it was time to move on.98 
III. REDISH’S LASTING CONTRIBUTION 
But as Redish may be incorrect in Abstention, Separation of Powers, 
and the Limits of the Judicial Function in asserting that the abstention 
doctrines constitute a constitutional violation, so too is he incorrect in 
Intersystemic Redundancy in minimizing the importance of his earlier 
work. Professor Redish may not have prevailed in convincing the bench 
and the academy as to the merits of his thesis, but he did prevail in 
changing the prevailing conceptions of the meaning of judicial activism 
and judicial restraint. 
 
95 See Redish, supra note 1, at 89. 
96 See Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero 
Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1370 (2000). 
97 Id. 
98 See id. 
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When Redish wrote Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits 
of the Judicial Function in 1984, the lines as to what constitutes judicial 
activism were predictively drawn. Those who believed that the federal 
courts should be reluctant to interfere with the actions of the political 
branches, when possible, were considered judicial conservatives who 
favored judicial restraint.99 Those who contended that the federal courts 
should be relatively uninhibited in exercising judicial power, even when 
that exercise entailed overturning the actions of the political branch, were 
characterized as activists.100 
Of course, both terms were politically drawn and politically laden. 
Commitment to judicial restraint was seen to be salutary, connoting a 
respect for the rule of law and deference to the decisions of the elected 
branches.101 The charge of judicial activism, in turn, was just that—an 
accusatory charge that implied an illegitimate legal decision made in 
pursuit of preferred results.102 But there was a nonpolitical, academic side to 
this debate as well. Alexander Bickel’s highly influential book, The Least 
Dangerous Branch, for example, characterized judicial efforts to avoid 
politically laden controversies as exemplifying passive virtues.103 
Support for federal court abstention clearly fell on the judicial-restraint 
side of the ledger.104 The abstention doctrines were devices that allowed the 
 
99 See Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 561 
(2010). 
100 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint to the 
Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 625‒26 (2002) (reproducing a Nixon 
quotation describing the former President’s opinions on judicial appointments, from Richard Nixon 
Campaign Speech (Nov. 2, 1968), in 27 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., May 23, 1969, at 798); see also 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 207 (1985); William P. Marshall, 
Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (2002) 
(“[J]udicial activism is most often associated with judicial invalidation of decisions by elected 
representatives.”). 
101 See Siegel, supra note 99, at 558. 
102 See id. at 564, 570; see also STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM 6‒7 (2009) (describing how Ronald Reagan, as a candidate, promised to appoint only judges 
“who understand the danger of short-circuiting the electoral process and disenfranchising the people 
through judicial activism” (quoting Ronald Reagan, Remarks During a White House Briefing for 
United States Attorneys, in 21 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1276, 1278 (Oct. 21, 
1985))); Gerhardt, supra note 100 (“[The Court should not be] superlegislators with a free hand to 
impose their social and political viewpoints upon the American People.” (quoting Richard Nixon 
Campaign Speech, supra note 100)). 
103 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111–98 (2d ed. 1986). Bickel, I 
should note, does not discuss abstention in The Least Dangerous Branch, focusing more on 
justiciability doctrines. 
104 See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (describing abstention as a 
doctrine under which “the federal courts, ‘exercising a wise discretion,’ restrain their authority because 
of ‘scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments’ and for the smooth 
working of the federal judiciary” (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 457 (1919), and Di 
Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n, 296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935))). 
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federal courts to delay or avoid hearing challenges to government action. 
An abstaining court would therefore not even be in a position to invalidate 
the actions of the political branches. 
Redish, however, by demonstrating that the doctrine of abstention 
could be as easily characterized as an example of judicial activism as it 
could one of judicial restraint, exposed the false dichotomy underlying the 
restraint‒activism distinction.105 Courts that refused to become involved in 
controversial matters could be equally criticized for activism as those who 
willingly entered the fray. Courts that overturned the decisions of elected 
officials could be characterized as acting with judicial restraint because 
they adhered to Congress’s jurisdictional directives. Conversely, courts that 
refrained from exercising their jurisdiction could be criticized for their 
activism.106 
In accomplishing this task, Redish also advanced another important 
proposition—that the purpose of the federal courts was actually to decide 
cases and not avoid them. By contending that the federal courts’ failure to 
decide cases properly before them constituted a constitutional violation, 
Redish powerfully showed that the activism charge leveled against the 
federal courts was profoundly off the mark. How was it activism for the 
federal courts to do what both the Constitution and Congress required them 
to do? 
This is not to say, of course, that immediately after the publication of 
Redish’s work, political charges of judicial activism aimed at federal courts 
exercising their jurisdiction faded from the scene. Needless to say, these 
charges continue to abound and flourish even though, as Neil Siegel 
documents, the analytic basis of those charges has become less clear.107 But 
Redish did change the terms of the academic debate. After Abstention, 
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, the virtue of 
judicial restraint could no longer be measured on the basis of whether a 
court refused to exercise jurisdiction in a case properly before it. 
CONCLUSION 
In Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function, Martin H. Redish set forth the dramatic thesis that the Court’s 
 
105 Professor Althouse contends that the recognition of “[t]his basic paradox of jurisdiction—that 
restraint is a form of activism and activism a form of restraint—dates back at least to Marbury v. 
Madison.” Althouse, supra note 83, at 1038–39. Perhaps so. But Redish gave this point salience in the 
contemporary debate. 
106 As Professor Siegel documents, current political battles over constitutional interpretation reflect 
these changing conceptions. No longer do political conservatives consistently claim that deference to 
the decisions of political branches is judicial restraint. They now, in some circumstances, contend that a 
judge is an activist if she refuses to strike down popularly passed legislation. See Siegel, supra note 99, 
at 570 (citing Kirk Victor, Court’s in Session, NAT’L J., May 23, 2009, at 37, 37). 
107 See id. at 588. 
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judge-made abstention doctrines violated constitutional norms of separation 
of powers. Redish’s article was brilliant, creative, and prescient. It was also 
wrong. The constitutionality of the abstention doctrines can be justified on 
numerous grounds, and although the application of the doctrines may 
sometimes be problematic, the goals of comity and federalism that they are 
designed to serve are laudable. 
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function, nevertheless, was and continues to be a critically important work 
in the law of federal courts. In the end, the article may not have changed 
the bottom line in the calculation of whether the abstention doctrines are 
constitutional. But through this work, Professor Redish did change the 
manner in which the “virtue” of judicial restraint was conceptualized—
replacing the reflexive vision that insisted judicial interference with the 
decisions of political actors was activism with the more nuanced view that 
judicial restraint might also mean courts performing the tasks to which they 
were assigned. And for that, federal courts scholars owe him an enduring 
debt of gratitude. 
